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INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court, in United States v. Booker, found the
United
States
Sentencing
Guidelines
("Guidelines")
unconstitutional, uprooting nearly twenty years of structured
sentencing in federal courts.1 As a result of this uprooting,
2
judges now have much greater discretion in sentencing.
Appellate review of sentencing decisions, however, limits this
discretion by requiring district courts to impose only reasonable
sentences.
An important issue thus emerges regarding
the appropriate amount of consideration and deference
appellate courts should afford when reviewing sentences for
reasonableness. 3 Although courts have recognized that the

t J.D. Candidate, June 2008, St. John's University School of Law; B.A., 2003
The Evergreen State College.
I See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) (finding that
18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(b)(1) and 3742(e) (2000) were unconstitutional and that the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines were "effectively advisory" rather than mandatory);
see also David J. D'Addio, Sentencing After Booker: The Impact of Appellate Review
on Defendants' Rights, 24 YALE L. & POLy REV. 173, 176 (2006) ("[T]he Guideline
'range is now nothing more than a suggestion that may or may not be persuasive to
a judge when weighed against the numerous other considerations listed in' what
remains of the Sentencing Reform Act." (quoting Booker, 543 U.S. at 298-300
(Stevens, J., dissenting in part))); Sandra D. Jordan, Have We Come Full Circle?
Judicial Sentencing DiscretionRevived in Booker and Fanfan, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 615,
616 (2006) ("After almost twenty years of structured sentencing in federal courts,
judicial discretion has been restored and prosecutorial power has been curtailed.").
2 See Jordan, supra note 1, at 620 (arguing that Booker "restores the
constitutional balance of power between the three branches of government" by
allowing district courts greater discretion in sentencing).
3 See id. at 673 (arguing that some circuits "are missing the point" as regards to
the appropriate level of deference to afford sentences).
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reasonableness standard used for reviewing sentences is limited 4
and fairly well-defined, 5 it admittedly lacks precision. 6 This lack
of precision necessitates that appellate courts perform careful,
fact-sensitive review of sentences to ensure that the sentences
further the aims of the criminal justice system.
Fact-sensitive appellate review takes on heightened
significance in the context of white-collar crime, 7 because district
4 See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 445 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2006) (emphasizing
that "[tihe sentencing court's discretion remains constrained by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
(2000)"), quoted in United States v. Rattoballi, 452 F.3d 127, 132 (2d Cir. 2006).
5 See, e.g., Rattoballi, 452 F.3d at 133 ("[While reasonableness admits to a
range, not a point, it also is a concept that implies boundaries, even if those
boundaries provide for some latitude.") (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
6 See United States v. Cunningham, 429 F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 2005)
(acknowledging that reasonableness amounts to "a range, not a point").
7 See generally J. KELLY STRADER, UNDERSTANDING WHITE COLLAR CRIME 1-3
(2002). The term "white-collar crime" was first popularized by criminologist and
sociologist Edwin Sutherland who defined white-collar crime as a crime "committed
by a person of respectability and high social status in the course of his occupation."
Id. at 1. The United States Department of Justice provides the following alternative
definition of white-collar crime to this "somewhat outdated" socio-economic
definition provided by Sutherland:
[N]onviolent crime for financial gain committed by means of deception by
persons whose occupational status is entrepreneurial, professional or semiprofessional and utilizing their special occupational skills and
opportunities; also, nonviolent crime for financial gain utilizing deception
and committed by anyone having a special technical and professional
knowledge of business and government, irrespective of the person's
occupation.
Id. at 1-2 (quoting BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
DICTIONARY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE DATA TERMINOLOGY 215 (2d ed. 1981)).
Strader, however, believes that even this definition is unsatisfactory and
suggests that white-collar crime may be defined:
as crime that does not: (a) necessarily involve force against a person or
property; (b) directly relate to the possession, sale, or distribution of
narcotics; (c) directly relate to organized crime activities; (d) directly relate
to such national policies as immigration, civil rights, or national security;
or (e) directly involve "vice crimes" or the common theft of property.
Id. at 2; see also STANTON WHEELER ET AL., SITTING IN JUDGMENT: THE

SENTENCING OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIMINALS 5 (1988) ("[T]he central ingredients [of

white-collar crimes] are that they are non-violent, economic crimes.. . that are
committed by persons in traditionally 'white-collar' jobs."). At least two
qualifications are necessary in regard to these general definitions. First, these
definitions obfuscate "the actual physical or violent consequences of white-collar
crime," such as the effects of unsafe environmental practices and physical harm that
can result from deprivation of economic resources. See BRIAN K. PAYNE,
INCARCERATING WHITE-COLLAR OFFENDERS: THE PRISON EXPERIENCE AND BEYOND

6-8 (2003). It is necessary to understand the violent nature of white-collar crime
notwithstanding the traditional definitions above. Second, because of the nature of
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courts confront a "sentencing world [that] is particularly
complicated." 8 I infer the complicated nature of sentencing
white-collar criminals, in part, from the number of post-Booker
white-collar sentences that appellate courts have remanded for
resentencing. In point of fact, several appellate courts have
recently vacated, over "vigorous dissent," 9 sentences of whitecollar criminals-those who use economic clout "as a weapon and
shield to defraud others and make[] it difficult to detect and
punish the fraud"1 0-because
they found the sentences
unreasonable.1 1 Recently, in United States v. Davis,12 the Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit vacated a sentence of one day in
prison imposed on a defendant convicted of two counts of bank
fraud where the recommended Guideline range was thirty to
13
thirty-seven months.
the lead case being reviewed in this Comment, this paper concerns itself primarily
with what is called "control fraud," rather than, for example, crime involving
environmental degradation or unsafe products. See infra note 9 and accompanying
text.
s WHEELER, supra note 7, at 18.
9 See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 458 F.3d 491, 500-01, 504 (6th Cir. 2006)
(Keith, J., dissenting) (describing the court's reversal of a sentence of a white-collar
criminal as a "complete miscarriage of justice" and raising concerns about
"establish[ing] a precedent whereby this Court is micromanaging the sentencing
process and second guessing the district court's determination after presiding over
the hearings").
10 WILLIAM K. BLACK, THE BEST WAY TO ROB A BANK IS TO OWN ONE: How
CORPORATE EXECUTIVES AND POLITICIANS LOOTED THE S&L INDUSTRY 1 (2005)

(defining "control fraud"). Although white-collar crime includes crimes involving, for
example, unsafe products and environmental degradation, this Comment uses the
term in a more restricted sense.
1' See, e.g., Davis, 458 F.3d at 492-93 (reversing sentence of one day in prison of
a defendant convicted of two counts of bank fraud where the recommended
Guidelines range was 30 to 37 months); United States v. Wallace, 458 F.3d 606, 607
(7th Cir. 2006) (vacating sentence of three years of probation plus a $2,000 fine for
defendant convicted of wire fraud where the recommended Guidelines range was 24
to 30 months); United States v. Thurston, 456 F.3d 211, 212, 220 (1st Cir. 2006)
(vacating sentence of three months imprisonment of a defendant convicted of
conspiring to defraud Medicare of over five million dollars where the recommended
Guidelines range was 60 months); United States v. Crisp, 454 F.3d 1285, 1286-87
(11th Cir. 2006) (reversing sentence of defendant convicted of making false
statements to a financial institution that included five-hour incarceration term
where the recommended Guidelines range was 24 to 30 months); United States v.
Rattoballi, 452 F.3d 127, 128-29 (2d Cir. 2006) (vacating sentence of defendant
convicted of conspiracy to rig bids and conspiracy to commit mail fraud of one year of
home confinement and five years of probation where the recommended Guidelines
range was 27 to 33 months).
12 458 F.3d at 491.
13 Id. at 492-93.
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The Davis court convicted the defendant, William Davis, of
two counts of bank fraud. 14 Davis, part owner and president of
Fries Correctional Equipment of Kentucky, Inc., omitted
$100,000 of debt from a financial statement submitted to a local15
bank as part of an application for a renewed line of credit.
After Fries Correctional defaulted on the loan, the bank filed a
civil action against Davis. 16 During a deposition in the civil
action, Davis claimed that he no longer owned several securities
listed in a financial statement, but this claim conflicted with
other financial statements. 17 Shortly thereafter, Davis and his
wife declared bankruptcy and the federal government notified
Davis that it intended to initiate criminal proceedings against
him.18 The bank had failed to recover $600,000 from Davis at the
time his bankruptcy ended. 19 The government indicted Davis in
December of 1999, and a jury convicted him of two counts of bank
fraud, which related to the omission of the $100,000 debt from a
financial statement provided to the20 bank and the false
statements made during the deposition.
Although the district court initially sentenced Davis in 2003
using the mandatory Guidelines, the Sixth Circuit remanded the
case for resentencing in 2005 under the Post-Booker advisory
Guideline sentencing scheme. 21 On remand, the district court
determined that Davis's criminal history category of (I) and his
offense level of (19) generated an advisory Guideline range of
thirty to thirty-seven months. 22 The court then applied 18
U.S.C.§ 3553(a) factors 23 before sentencing Davis to one day in
14
15
16
17
18

Id. at 492.
Id. at 493.
Id.
Id.
Id.

19 Id.
20

Id.

Id. at 493-94.
Id. at 494.
23 Id. 18 U.S.C § 3553(a) provides in relevant part:
The court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than
necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this
subsection. The court, in determining the particular sentence to be
imposed, shall consider(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed(a) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for
21
22
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prison for each of the two bank-fraud counts to be served
concurrently, one year of home confinement, three years of
supervised release, and 100 hours of community service. 24 The
district court provided several justifications for varying from the
Guideline range, including Davis's age of seventy years, his
status as a retired social security recipient, his relationship with
his grandchildren, and the lapse of fourteen years between the
time of the commission of the offenses and the date of
sentencing. 2 5 Moreover, the district court found that Davis no
longer posed a danger to the public, that the sentence effectively
deterred and rehabilitated Davis, and that the sentence would
26
not promote disrespect for the law.
On review, a split Sixth Circuit reversed the sentence and
remanded for resentencing, holding that the imposition of oneday of incarceration, one-year of home confinement, three years
of supervised release, and 100 hours of community service was
unreasonable. 27 The Davis court, while focusing heavily on the
"extraordinary variance" of 99.89%, rested its ruling primarily on

the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(b) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(c) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(d) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most
effective manner;
(3) the kinds of sentences available;
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established [and
recommended by the Sentencing Guidelines] ...
(5) any pertinent policy statement... issued by the sentencing
commission...
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among
defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar
conduct; and
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000).
24 Davis, 458 F.3d at 495.
25 Id. at 494.
26

Id.

See id. at 495, 500. As noted in Davis, courts have distinguished between
procedural and substantive unreasonableness. Id. at 495. This valuable distinction,
recognized by other circuits, see, e.g., United States v. Rattoballi, 452 F.3d 127, 13132 (2d Cir. 2006), differentiates substantively unreasonable sentences from
procedurally unreasonable sentences, such as where a district court fails to
appreciate the non-mandatory nature of the guidelines, fails to correctly calculate
the sentencing range under the guidelines, or fails to consider the § 3553(a) factors.
Davis, 458 F.3d at 495. This Comment, like the case under review, focuses only on
substantive unreasonableness.
27

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:383

three findings. 28 First, the court concluded that "the 14-year gap
sentencing
second
his
and
crimes
Davis's
between
hearing.., does not support such a dramatic variance (and
indeed may not support a variance at all)." 29 Second, the court
noted that although "a district court may account for a
defendant's age at sentencing .... Davis's age [of seventy did not]
warranto a one-day sentence." 30 Third, the court highlighted
that "the sentence represent[ed] the most extreme variance
possible, leaving no room to make reasoned distinctions between
Davis's variance and the variances that other, more worthy
defendants may deserve." 3 1 In addition to these reasons, the
court appeared hesitant to allow the district court to exacerbate
disparities between white-collar criminal and nonwhite-collar
criminal sentences, "[o]ne of the central reasons for creating the
sentencing guidelines," by handing down a one-day sentence for a
32
defendant convicted of bank fraud.
The court, nonetheless, reached its conclusion over
"vigorous[] dissent."33 Judge Keith, in his dissenting opinion,
expressed that he was "saddened and distressed by the majority's
opinion," which he described as "a complete miscarriage of
justice."3 4 Judge Keith argued that "[r]egrettably, the majority's
holding, finding Davis's sentence substantively unreasonable,
strips the district court of its power to issue a reasonable
sentence in accordance with the now advisory sentencing
guidelines." 35 In particular, Judge Keith noted that the court's
failure to provide "proper deference" was based on a "formulaic
assessment of how much the sentence varie[d] from the advisory
28 See Davis, 458 F.3d at 496-500.

29 Id. at 497. Although the court noted that "[d]elays between the time a crime
is committed and the time a guilty defendant serves his sentence of course should
not be casually ignored," the question confronting the court was "whether the delay
supplies an independent reason for such a marked deviation from the advisory
guidelines range." Id.
30 Id. at 498.
31 Id. at 499.
32 See id. (citations omitted) ("One of the central reasons for creating the
sentencing guidelines, moreover, was to ensure stiffer penalties for white-collar
crime and to eliminate disparities between white-collar sentences and sentences for
other crimes. A one-day sentence for this bank fraud conviction necessarily slights
this worthy goal.").
33 See id. at 505 (Keith, J., dissenting) ("The district court, in my judgment, has
not abused its discretion. I therefore vigorously dissent.").
34 Id. at 500.
35 Id. at 501.
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guideline[s]." 36 Judge Keith argued that the court should have
deferred to the district court's consideration of individualized
factors, such as Davis's age, the fourteen years between the
offense and sentencing, the non-violent nature of the crime,
Davis's lack of criminal activity since the time of the offense,
Davis's status as an unemployed, bankrupt, social security
recipient, and Davis's move to another state where he could be
with his children and grandchildren. 37 Given these factors and
the necessity of yielding to district court discretion to impose
individualized sentences, Judge Keith would have affirmed the
sentence, rather than establish a precedent by which courts
"micromanag[e] the sentencing process." 38
Judge Keith argued compellingly that the court's eagerness
to distill the reasonableness inquiry into a numbers game
represents an unhealthy trend in the development of post-Booker
reasonableness review of sentences of white-collar criminals.
The court's rationale seems to violate the spirit of Booker, which
sought to restore balances of power after the Guidelines
diminished judicial influence in favor of increased prosecutorial
power. 39 Notwithstanding Judge Keith's observations, the Davis
court did correctly find the sentence unreasonable, because the
sentence does not further the aims of the criminal justice system.
In reviewing the Davis court's ruling, this Comment will
suggest that courts rely more heavily on the social harm caused
by white-collar crime when imposing sentences, in place of
numerical variance, to ensure that the spirit of Booker flourishes.
Reference to social harm as a basis for punishment will likely
further the goal of striking a balance between the excessive
deference afforded judges prior to the promulgation of the
Guidelines and a return to the rigid and perfunctory application
of Guideline sentences. This Comment will also urge courts to
refrain from over-reliance on numerical variance between
sentences imposed and suggested Guideline sentences. In place
of an algebraic analysis, courts should openly evaluate social
harm, and, where applicable, use social harm as a basis for
Id. at 501-02.
37 Id. at 502-03.
38 Id. at 504-05.
39 See Jordan, supra note 1, at 626 ("Efforts to eliminate disparity in sentencing
36

have resulted in an incursion on the independence of the federal judiciary, a transfer
of power from the judiciary to prosecutors and a proliferation of unjustifiably harsh
individual sentences.").
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finding nominal sentences imposed on white-collar criminals
Toward these ends, Part I briefly defines
unreasonable.
reasonableness review. Part II analyzes the Davis opinion,
highlights the decision's flawed approach to reasonableness
review, and advocates for the reinvigoration of retribution for
social harm as a primary basis for sentencing white-collar
criminals.
I.

REASONABLENESS REVIEW

In addition to finding the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
unconstitutional, the Booker court created a more flexible
approach to sentencing, utilizing a "practical" and "familiar"
Courts have distinguished
standard of reasonableness. 40
41
procedural reasonableness from substantive reasonableness,
and this Comment, like the Davis court, deals only with
substantive reasonableness-whether the length of a sentence is
reasonable in light of the factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
and other statutory concerns. 42 Put differently, substantive
reasonableness review concerns whether "a sentence [is]
sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the
43
purposes set forth in [§ 3553(a)(2)]."
In crafting the reasonableness standard, the court in Booker
sought to strike a balance between "a return to wholly
discretionary sentencing" and the negligible discretion that
existed under the mandatory Guidelines. 44 As courts have noted,
"review for reasonableness, though deferential, will not equate to

40 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 224 (2005) (Stevens, J., delivering
the opinion of the Court in part). Although some commentators have raised concerns
that "[u]nfortunately, Justice Breyer failed to define a 'reasonable' sentence in an
advisory Guideline regime," and that "few [circuit courts] have provided concrete
guidance to lower courts," see D'Addio, supra note 1, at 177, as the Supreme Court
has recognized, "the term 'unreasonable' is no doubt difficult to define... [but] it is a
common term in the legal world and, accordingly, federal judges are familiar with its
meaning," United States v. Wallace, 458 F.3d 606, 610 (7th Cir. 2006) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410 (2000)); see
also Booker, 543 U.S. at 262-63 (Breyer, J., delivering the opinion of the Court in
part) ("[W]e think it fair... to assume judicial familiarity with a 'reasonableness'
standard.").
41 See supra note 28.
42 See, e.g., United States v. Rattoballi, 452 F.3d 127, 131-32 (2d Cir. 2006); see
also supra note 22.
43 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000).
44 Rattoballi,452 F.3d at 132.
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45
a 'rubber stamp'" and "admits to a range, not a point."
Reasonableness review involves more than just "ensuring that
district courts appreciate their sentencing discretion and issue
46 It also "will permit appellate
mechanically correct sentences."
courts to minimize sentencing disparities between and among
district courts" and "eliminate unwarranted disparities circuit47
wide.,
Two additional points should be kept in mind with regard to
First, many circuits have
the reasonableness standard.
attempted to balance the antagonistic interests of deference and
48
adherence to the Guidelines by applying proportionality review
49 This
or by presuming the reasonableness of the Guidelines.
Comment suggests that courts avoid mechanical, numerical
review of district court sentences. Second, reasonableness review

45 See, e.g., id. at 132-33 (internal quotation marks omitted) (noting that the
concept of reasonableness "implies boundaries, even if those boundaries provide
some latitude").
46 United States v. Davis, 458 F.3d 491, 495 (6th Cir. 2006).
47 Id. at 495-96.
48 A majority of circuits have adopted the view that if "the district court
independently chooses to deviate from the advisory guidelines range," then "the
farther the judge's sentence departs from the guidelines sentence[,] the more
compelling the justification based on factors in section 3553(a) must be." Davis, 458
F.3d at 496 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Dean, 414
F.3d 725, 729 (7th Cir. 2005)); accord United States v. Simpson, 430 F.3d 1177, 1187
n.10 (D.C. Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Martin, 455 F.3d 1227, 1235 (11th
Cir. 2006); United States v. Cage, 451 F.3d 585, 594 (10th Cir. 2006); United States
v. Smith, 445 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Lazenby, 439 F.3d 928, 932
(8th Cir. 2006); United States v. Moreland, 437 F.3d 424, 434 (4th Cir. 2006); United
States v. Duhon, 440 F.3d 711, 715 (5th Cir. 2006). But see Rattoballi, 452 F.3d at
134-35:
While we have yet to adopt this [proportionality] standard [of review] as a
rule in this circuit, and do not do so here, we emphasize that our own
ability to uphold a sentence as reasonable will be informed by the district
court's statement of reasons (or lack thereof) for the sentence that it elects
to impose.
Id.
49 See, e.g., Davis, 458 F.3d at 496 ("IWhen the district court issues withinguidelines sentence-when the independent views of the sentencing judge and the
Sentencing Commission align-we apply a presumption of reasonableness to the
sentence."); Rattoballi, 452 F.3d at 133 ("We appreciate that the guidelines are still
generalizations that can point to outcomes that may appear unreasonable to
sentencing judges in particular cases." (internal quotation marks omitted)). The
Supreme Court is poised to consider "the appropriateness of the presumption of
reasonableness that some courts of appeals apply to sentences that fall within the
range recommended by the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines." Supreme Court Will
Confront Tough Issues Related to Federal Sentencing After Booker, 80 CRIM. L. REP.
155 (2006).
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takes on special significance- in the context of white-collar crime
where competing tendencies exist. 50 On the one hand, judges
tend to view white-collar criminals more sympathetically than
others and the impact of white-collar crime as more difficult to
measure. 51 On the other hand, judges wish to avoid giving the
impression that they confer special treatment on whitecollar criminals. 52 These competing tendencies may result in
inconsistencies in sentencing and frustrate attempts to explain
sentencing decisions.
II. THE DAVIs RULING
A.

The Davis Court Reached the Correct Result for the Wrong
Reasons
The Davis court correctly vacated Davis's unreasonable
sentence, but did so for incorrect reasons. In reaching the
decision, the court should have avoided overemphasizing the size
of the sentence's deviation from the advisory Guideline range,
because overemphasis on numerical deviation encourages nonindividualized, mechanical application of the Guidelines and
shifts the balance of powers too greatly toward the legislature
and prosecutors. This does not mesh with the spirit of Booker
and creates problems in the context of white-collar crime. A
better approach would have included greater exploration of the
social harm caused by Davis's acts.
The Davis court too eagerly distilled the reasonableness
inquiry into a numbers game. 53 As an initial matter, the court
50 See David L. Hudson, Jr., Coming Down Heavy on Light Sentences: 11th
Circuit Rejects Short Jail Terms for White-Collar Criminals, A.B.A. J. E-REPORT,
July 21, 2006, available at 5 No. 29 ABAJEREP 1 (Westlaw) (quoting authorities
stating that "[n]ationwide there is a trend for courts to be tougher on white-collar
crimes" and that white-collar criminals "tend to be more sympathetic and the impact
of the crimes harder to measure").
51 Id.
52 Id.

53 See Davis, 458 F.3d at 497-500. In support of its reasoning, the Davis Court
cited the following passage from an article by James G. Carr, Chief Judge of the
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio:
[A] critical factor that must be taken into account when evaluating how
well or- properly judges exercise their discretion when departing from the
Guideline range ... [is] the extent to which judicially initiated departures
are outside the applicable range. There is a sizable difference between a 10
or 20 percent variance from a Guideline minimum or maximum and a
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overemphasized the amount that the sentence deviated from the
advisory Guideline range by repeatedly highlighting that the
sentence imposed by the district court varied by 99.89% from the
Second, the court's adoption of
advisory Guideline range.
requires that the further the
which
proportionality review,
judge's sentence departs from the Guideline range the more
compelling the justification must be, seems to replace deferential
review of sentences with an algebraic formula that discourages
sentences, even where
district courts from issuing non-Guideline
54
appropriate.
seems
such sentences
Other circuits have been more sensitive to pitfalls of a
For example, the
numerical approach to reasonableness.
Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Wallace, noted:
We are reluctant to distill the reasonableness inquiry into a
numbers game that relies only on a numerical or percentage
line for reductions. The percentage reductions will always seem
larger if the overall number is a smaller one: 24 months less
than a possible sentence of 25 months would be a 96%

variance of 50, 60, or 80 percent.

Id. at 500 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting James G. Carr, Some Thoughts on
Sentencing Post-Booker, 17 FED. SENT'G REP. 295, 296 (2005)).

The Court continued:
No doubt, the district court retains ample discretion to grant Davis a
variance on this record. And it will have an opportunity to do so on remand.
But, for the reasons given, even the most animated application of the
parsimony requirement-that the district court impose "a sentence
sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes set
forth in" § 3553(a)(2)--cannot justify a one-day sentence in this case. To
rule otherwise, we respectfully submit, would intimate that reasonableness
review is a theory, not a practice, and would fairly leave litigants
wondering what downward (or upward) variances exceed a district court's
discretion is a 99.89% downward variance on less-than extraordinary facts
lies within that discretion.
Id.

As Judge Keith noted in his dissent:
The majority also reduces the evaluation of the district court's sentence to
a formulaic assessment of how much the sentence varies from the advisory
guideline range to determine whether the defendant's sentence is
unreasonable. In engaging in this mechanical assessment, the majority
starts this .Court down the path of the pre-Booker days where the district
courts were bound by an algebraic application of the guidelines. This
precedent will inevitably lead to the district courts feeling reluctant to ever
impose a sentence below the advisory guideline range for fear of reversal at
the appellate level.
Id. at 502 (Keith, J., dissenting).
54
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reduction; 24 months less than a possible sentence of 240
months would be a 10% reduction. 55
As the Wallace court hints at, proportionality review
inappropriately restricts sentencing judges, because it tends to
allow numbers to trump the factors relevant to sentencing and to
diminish reference to the principles of punishment that
underscore the Guidelines. Bear in mind two points. First, in
practice, the use of proportionality review requires that district
courts avoid significantly deviating from the Guidelines
except under extraordinary circumstances. The circumstances
surrounding most crimes, especially white-collar crimes, are
likely to be anything but extraordinary-by any reasonable
definition.
Certainly, the district court in Davis relied on
ordinary circumstances: his advanced age, his family, his limited
finances, and the non-violent nature of the offense.
But
punishment may still be justified-or lack justification-by a
totality of ordinary circumstances. 56 Proportionality review does
not allow this aggregation. Second, proportionality review allows
prosecutors to argue appropriateness of sentences based on
percentage of variance instead of having to justify the
punishment based on relevant factors and circumstances and the
aims of punishment. This shifts power to prosecutors and away
from judges. These two points illustrate how proportionality
review eviscerates the individualized consideration mandated by
Booker.
Appellate courts should replace proportionality review and
encourage district courts to determine whether punishment of an
individual satisfies the goals of retribution, deterrence,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation. An approach emphasizing
these goals decreases the likelihood of imposing unnecessary
punishment.
It also reduces the likelihood of a return to

55 United States v. Wallace, 458 F.3d 606, 613 (7th Cir. 2006). Despite this
sensitivity, the Wallace court still used a proportionality review to determine the
reasonableness of the sentence. See id.
56 For example, in the recent case United States v. Jones, 460 F.3d 191 (2d Cir.
2006), the Second Circuit appears to have taken this approach where the court
affirmed the reasonableness of a sentence that substantially deviated from the
Guidelines range. Id. at 193-94. The court affirmed the sentence based on the
defendant's consistent work ethic, support of his wife and son, assistance and
support for other members of his family, the loss of his father, his attempt at college,
and other similar, ordinary characteristics. Id.
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draconian elements of the sentencing Guidelines 57 while allowing
judges leeway to give individualized sentences. In the context of
white-collar crime, this approach allows the judiciary to focus on
the goals of retribution and avoid the return of excessive
prosecutorial power. If the current view of sentencing deems
individual consideration of criminals essential, then a nonalgebraic, holistic exploration of individual circumstances-with
a critical eye towards understanding the social harm caused by
the defendant, the culpability of his or her actions, and the
likelihood that a particular defendant, and others similarly
situated, will be adequately deterred from this future conductwill tend to be more just.
The Davis Court Should Have Placed GreaterEmphasis on
Harm Caused
The Davis court failed to adequately address the social harm
caused by Davis's actions. The severity of the social harm, like
that caused by so many white-collar crimes, alone justified
finding the sentence unreasonable. Many commentators and
judges continue to deny or devalue the social harm caused
by white collar crime, despite popular and congressional
recognition. 58 Although the Davis court noted that "[o]ne of the
central reasons for creating the sentencing guidelines ...was to
ensure stiffer penalties for white-collar crime and to eliminate
disparities between white-collar sentences and sentences for
other crimes," it only acknowledged the social harm caused by
59 Instead of
Davis's actions in the limited context of deterrence.
relegating social harm to the realm of deterrence, courts such as
Davis should use social harm as an independent basis for finding
nominal sentences of white-collar criminals unreasonable.

B.

57 See Jordan, supra note 1, at 657.

See, e.g., Davis, 458 F.3d at 503 (Keith, J., dissenting) ('WMore importantly,
[Davis's] fraud conviction was not a crime of violence."); Paul Rosenzweig,
Sentencing of CorporateFraud and White Collar Crime, HERITAGE FOUND., Mar. 26,
2003, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Crime/testO32403.cfm ("But it is fair to
wonder whether equating corporate fraud with murder or treason truly captures the
'just desert' component of criminal law.").
59 See Davis, 458 F.3d at 498-99 ("While the district court indicated that this
sentence would serve the goals of societal deterrence, it is hard to see how a one-day
sentence for a lucrative business crime satisfies that goal.") (citation omitted).
58
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Harm Caused by White-Collar Crime and the Recognition of
Harm as Justification for Punishment
Yes, as through this world I've wandered
I've seen lots of funny men;
Some will rob you with a six-gun
6
And some with a fountain pen. 0

Woody Guthrie's folk-lesson rings true. White-collar crimes
61
cause substantial social harm by undermining the economy,
exacerbating poverty and the wealth divide, eroding trust, 62 and
depriving individuals of time and resources, both physical and
economic. 63 Courts should consider these serious social harms
when determining individual sentences and when reviewing
those sentences for reasonableness.
Although judges often express the view that white-collar
crime lacks violence and identifiable victims, 64 this belief tends to
obscure the severity of the harm caused by white-collar crimes.
A deeper understanding of the social harm caused by white-collar
crime, however, helps clarify the general, popular abhorrence of
white-collar crime. This deeper understanding draws attention
away from general deterrence as the sole or primary rationale for
substantial sentences of incarceration for white-collar criminals,
and towards the retributive aspects of sentencing white-collar
criminals.
Courts have routinely failed to adequately identify and
properly analyze the harm caused by white-collar crime.
Identifying these failures helps reveal social harm-the
"negation, endangering, or destruction of an individual, group, or
60 WOODY GUTHRIE, Pretty Boy Floyd, on STRUGGLE (Sanga Music, Inc. 1958),
available at http://www.woodyguthrie.orgLyrics/Pretty-Boy-Floyd.htm.
61 See, e.g., BLACK, supra note 10, at 5-6. As William K. Black notes: "Waves of
control fraudj produce bubbles that must collapse. [Lending continues, which delays
collapse], thus hyperinflating the bubble. The bigger the bubble and the longer it
continues, the worse the problems it causes." Id. Black further explains that "waves
of control fraud will create, inflate, and extend bubbles." Id. at 6.
62 See PAYNE, supra note 7, at 77-79 ("Perhaps one of the most significant
consequences of white-collar crime is the erosion of trust that occurs.").
63 See id. at 75 (identifying three specific types of losses individuals experience
as a result of white-collar offenses as "physical deprivations, economic deprivations,
and time deprivations").
64 See WHEELER ET AL., supra note 7, at 64 (emphasizing that judges tend to
view white-collar crime as unique due to absence of violence and that "[o]nly rarely
d[o] a judge's comment[s] indicate any possible similarity between white-collar
crimes and violent crimes").
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state interest which was deemed socially valuable" 65-as an
independent basis for punishment. Perhaps courts often fail to
recognize the social harm caused by white-collar crime because
the economic nature of the crimes conceals the victims. Yet the
social harm white-collar crimes cause can be measured for the
purpose of punishment, even if-like other non-white-collar
crimes-not with exact precision. 66 Moreover, the severity of the
social harm caused by a particular white-collar crime can be
evaluated by reference to four categories: (1) the amount of
monetary loss, (2) the "spread" of the events over time and place,
(3) the nature of the victim, and (4) the presence and nature of
violation of trust.6 7 This sort of a detailed consideration of social
harm caused by the white-collar crime provides a more
substantial basis for punishment than a mere algebraic formula
or over-reliance on general deterrence.
2.

The Davis Court

Accordingly, the Davis court should have considered the
social harm of Davis's acts as a basis for finding Davis's sentence
unreasonable. This consideration of the social harm caused by
the bank frauds would have appropriately reflected society's
belief and Congress's pronouncement that white-collar criminals
deserve substantial sentences. It also would have signaled a shift
in sentencing white-collar criminals from reliance only on
deterrence to reliance on social harm. Such a shift in judicial
analysis would, hopefully, further undermine the erroneous
belief that incarceration is not the most effective way to deter
white-collar crime and reinforce the general, popular view that
white-collar crimes cause widespread and serious social harm.
In any event, an understanding of the nature of criminal
law, which seeks to punish harm caused to society, not merely
68
The
harm to individuals, demands using this paradigm.
JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 122 (4th ed. 2006).
66 For example, society may appropriately punish a drunk driver who weaves on
the highway, but averts an accident, by reference to endangerment and
65

apprehension, even if these socially undesirable effects cannot be quantified. See id.
at 121.
67 See WHEELER ETAL., supra note 7, at 66.
68 See generally DRESSLER, supra note 65, at 121-22.
Because crimes are public wrongs, however, we may describe the harm
caused in a criminal case as a "social harm."
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atomistic perception that harm caused by white-collar crimes
amounts to merely an aggregate of harms caused to individuals
should be replaced with a view that society suffers an injury each
time a person afforded privilege, power, and prestige uses his or
her elevated position in society in such a manner that negates,
endangers, or destroys a socially recognized interest.
The Davis court, rather than relying on an algebraic
analysis, should have placed greater emphasis on the social harm
caused by the bank frauds. The court should have highlighted
that the sentence was unreasonable not simply because of the
size of the deviation and because a one-day sentence is unlikely
to deter future criminal conduct, but also because of the social
harm caused to society by Davis's action. The court should have
at least considered: (1) the harm Davis caused to the bank and
the community, including the $600,000 dollars the bank lost,
(2) Davis's repeated dishonesty to the bank and the court, (3) the
nature of the community, bank, and court that Davis sought to
defraud, and (4) the lack of respect towards the community and
the judicial system evinced by his actions. This social harm
alone justifies punishment greater than a one-day sentence.
CONCLUSION

The switch from a mandatory Guideline scheme to an
advisory Guideline scheme shifted the balance of power in
sentencing by placing greater discretion in sentencing judges.
Appellate courts play a significant role in ensuring that the aims
of the criminal justice system are met while deferring to
sentencing courts. In fulfilling this role, appellate courts should
look to theories of punishment and the Guideline factors when
evaluating the reasonableness of sentences. This focus is much
more sensible than evaluating non-Guideline sentences in terms
of numerical deviations, which increases the likelihood of nonindividualized sentences and creates an overly technical restraint
on sentencing judges.

Society values and has an interest in protecting people and
things.... Society is wronged when an actor invades any socially
recognized interest and diminishes its value. Specifically, "social harm"
may be defined as the "negation, endangering, or destruction of an
individual, group or state interest which was deemed socially valuable."
Id. (footnotes omitted).

2008]

UNITED STATES v. DAVIS

This is especially so in the context of white-collar crime.
Judges tend to think of white-collar crime as non-violent or
victimless. As a result, they may struggle to find bases for
vacating unreasonably low sentences of white-collar criminalsor in general imposing more substantial sentences. Accordingly,
circuit courts may overemphasize general deterrence and
numerical variance when evaluating sentences. In Davis, the
court took this approach and declared a sentence of one-day
incarceration unreasonable, with little, if any, consideration of
the social harm that resulted from the criminal activity.
By reviewing Davis, this Comment highlights the
importance of social harm as a basis for punishment of whitecollar criminals in hopes of encouraging appellate and district
courts to genuinely consider the seriousness of white-collar
By focusing on social harm, courts reaffirm that
crime.
sentencing of white-collar criminals is not a draconian method
that uses individuals as examples. Courts will also decrease the
likelihood that a common law of sentencing will develop in which
adversaries debate percentages, rather than reasons for
punishment, when arguing for a given sentence. Finally, this
focus gives true expression to the general, popular view that
white-collar criminals deserve punishment.
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